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Recently, the early stages of pandemic response has involved the use of antivirals.
These antivirals are often allocated to households dynamically throughout the pan-
demic with the aim being to retard the spread of infection. A drawback of this is
that there is a delay until infection is confirmed and antivirals are delivered. Here an
alternative allocation scheme is considered, where antivirals are instead preallocated
to households at the start of a pandemic, thus reducing this delay. To compare these
two schemes, a deterministic approximation to a novel stochastic household model is
derived, which allows efficient computation of key quantities such as the expected epi-
demic final size, expected early growth rate, expected peak size and expected peak time
of the epidemic. It is found that that the theoretical best choice of allocation scheme
depends on strain transmissibility, the delay in delivering antivirals under a dynamic
allocation scheme and the stockpile size. A broad summary is that for realistic stock-
pile sizes, a dynamic allocation scheme is superior with the important exception of the
epidemic final size under a severe pandemic scenario. Our results, viewed in conjunc-
tion with the practical considerations of implementing a preallocation scheme, support
a focus on attempting to reduce the delay in delivering antivirals under a dynamic
allocation scheme during a future pandemic.
1 Introduction
During the 2009 Swine influenza pandemic, many countries, including Australia, the United
States and the United Kingdom, utilised antivirals to help combat the spread of pandemic
influenza [17, 42, 45]. Antivirals, unlike other potential pandemic control measures, such as
vaccination, are not strain-specific, meaning that they can be used to potentially retard the
spread of a number of variants of influenza with little to no development time. Antivirals are
believed to achieve two things relevant to infectious disease spread: an infectious individual
is less likely to transmit infection when contact occurs with a susceptible individual, and an
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individual who is not infected has a stronger resistance to infection, even when contact is
made with an infectious individual who is not currently taking antivirals [26, 44].
Antiviral use is already part of the Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic
Influenza [16]. The way in which these antivirals would be used, similar to many other
countries [42, 45], is as follows: after the first confirmed infectious individual inside a house-
hold, a course of antivirals is allocated to each individual inside the household, regardless
of their infectious status. We term this antiviral allocation scheme dynamic allocation.
The reason for the entire household taking antivirals, regardless of whether each individ-
ual is infectious or not, is because a noticeable proportion of transmission occurs inside a
household—estimated to be approximately 30% of transmission [8, 20, 24]—and treatment
to susceptible individuals, known as prophylaxis, reduces their susceptibility. Furthermore,
the household also forms a convenient unit for distributional purposes [34]. The potential
issue with a dynamic allocation scheme is that there is a delay until antivirals arrive into the
household. This delay arises as the individuals in the household must wait until the infection
is confirmed (possibly requiring laboratory testing) and then antivirals are delivered, before
commencing their course of antivirals. If this delay is large, then the antivirals will have
little impact on the pandemic, as all transmission of infection will be complete before the
antivirals have started being taken [21, 8].
In this paper, investigation into an alternative allocation scheme, which we call preal-
location, that effectively removes the delay present in the dynamic allocation scheme, but
introduces some potential drawbacks. Under a preallocation scheme, instead of waiting for
a doctor’s diagnosis, all antivirals are allocated as soon as the pandemic begins, or poten-
tially in the absence of an outbreak in preparation for a pandemic. When an individual
begins showing symptoms of influenza, they are diagnosed, potentially in a less precise way
(compared to laboratory testing) such as contacting a government help-line and talking
to an expert [42, 40]. If it is decided that the individual is likely to have influenza, then
all members of the household begin taking antivirals just as they would under a dynamic
allocation scheme. Goldstein et al. [25] have previously investigated a similar scheme, but
with preallocation to high-risk individuals only, with the aim to minimise the probability
of death over the course of the pandemic. In contrast, this is the first paper to directly
compare more general household allocation schemes.
Under a preallocation scheme, then, the delay between becoming infectious and begin-
ning a course of antivirals is reduced as there is no waiting for the delivery of antivirals,
and also potentially no waiting for a doctor’s diagnosis or laboratory testing. However, it
is possible for individuals to take antivirals without being ill, as well as the potential for
antivirals to be ‘wasted’, as they could be preallocated to a household that never becomes
infected. To compare pre- and dynamic allocation, Markovian households model that can
incorporate both types of allocation is created and analysed[3, 28, 43, 8]. To help resolve the
results of the different allocations schemes, four key quantities about a pandemic are consid-
ered: (expected) epidemic final size, the total number of individuals who become infectious
throughout the entire pandemic [10]; the (expected) early growth rate, which represents the
(exponential) rate of growth early in a pandemic [3]; the (expected) peak size, which is the
maximum number of infectious individuals throughout the pandemic; and, the (expected)
peak time, which is the time at which the peak size is achieved.
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Modelling a pandemic in a structured population via the use of a continuous-time Markov
chain is a common technique, allowing for very detailed and intricate models [15, 35, 36].
Typically these Markov chain models have very large state spaces, so simulation using the
so-called Gillespie algorithm [22] is the only way to study the model. The Gillespie algorithm
scales poorly for models with complex dynamics in large populations, and so rigorously ex-
amining a variety of pandemic scenarios is time-consuming. More efficient approximations
have been developed, at the cost of some detail. The branching process approximation, in-
troduced by Ball and Donnelly [4] and utilised by Ross et al. [43] and Black et al. [8] is fast
to evaluate, but this only allows calculation of early time quantities. In this paper we take
a different approach and derive a deterministic approximation of our stochastic household
model, using the results of Kurtz [33]. Deterministic models with household structure have
been studied previously [28, 9], however this is the first to offer a detailed investigation into
the method of antiviral distribution and is certainly the most detailed model to leverage
this technique to date. This allows the efficient computation of all four quantities detailed
above as well as a full sensitivity analysis of our results.
The rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, the stochastic households epidemic
model incorporating the two antiviral allocation schemes is presented. In Section 3, the
deterministic approximation is derived for this model. In Section 4, exploration into the
effects of the preallocation scheme compared to the dynamic allocation scheme in a mild and
a severe pandemic outbreak is performed. It is demonstrated that for a severe outbreak, the
preallocation scheme leads to less total infectious individuals over the course of an outbreak.
For a mild outbreak, however, it is shown that a dynamic allocation scheme is generally the
better scheme. In Section 5, the results of this work are summarised, and some of the
limitations and potential extensions of the model are discussed.
2 Model
Consider a population that is partitioned into a fixed number, N , of distinct households and
assume that each individual belongs to exactly one household. The distribution of household
sizes, h, is fixed, where hk is the proportion of houses of size k in the population. For the
disease dynamics, assume a basic SEIR model where individuals in each household are cate-
gorised as susceptible, exposed (infected but not infectious), infectious, or recovered. While
a household is taking antivirals, the susceptibility and the infectivity of all the individuals
in the house is reduced [8]. Each household can be in one of four states with respect to
their antiviral status. A household may not have received antivirals (a = 0), be currently
taking antivirals (a = 1), have completed their course of antivirals (a = 2), or have been
preallocated antivirals but not begun taking them (a = 3). Finally, it is assumed that a
household only receives one course of antivirals either from preallocation or dynamically.
The dynamics of the epidemic and antiviral allocation process are modelled as a continuous-
time Markov chain. We say a household of size k is in configuration (s, e, i, k, a) if the house-
hold has s susceptible, e exposed and i infectious individuals, and currently has antiviral
status a. Let H(s,e,i,k,a)(t) be the number of households in configuration (s, e, i, k, a) at
time t, and H(t) = {H(s,e,i,k,a)(t)}. All events correspond to taking a household in a given
configuration and replacing it with another, thus the total number of households remains
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H(s,e,i,k,a) − 1, H(s−1,e+1,i,k,a) + 1
)
.
The set of all configurations for a single household of size k is,
Ck = {(s, e, i, k, a)|s, e, i ∈ {0, . . . , k}, s+ e+ i ≤ k, a = 0, 1, 2, 3},





where kmax is the largest household size in the population. The dynamics of our model
are defined by specifying the events and the rates at which they occur. We split these
into two parts to simplify our exposition—the disease dynamics and the antiviral allocation
dynamics—although these are dependent on each other.
Disease dynamics. There are two levels of mixing in this model: within a household and
between households [5, 3], so infection is either internal or from an external source. The
rate of infection inside a household of size k is governed by the parameter βk, such that
βk =
{
0 k = 1
β
k−1 k > 1,
(1)
as supported by empirical studies [13, 14, 27], whilst the rate of infection between households
is governed by the parameter α. If a household is taking antivirals (a = 1) then the
susceptibility and infectiousness of all those in the house is reduced by ρ and τ respectively.




sΛ(t), a = 0, 2, 3
(1− τ)(1− ρ)βksi+ (1− ρ)
α
Nk̄






is the total force of infection within the population and k̄ is the mean household size:
k̄ =
∑
k khk. The factor (1− τδa,1) in equation (2) takes into account the reduced infectiv-
ity of a house which is currently taking antivirals (a = 1). As in the standard SEIR model,
the per-individual rate of progression from exposed to infectious is σ, and the per-individual
rate of recovery from infectious to recovered is γ.
Antiviral dynamics. Throughout the epidemic, it is assumed that there is a limited
stockpile of M antiviral doses available at the beginning of the epidemic. There is a large
amount of flexibility in how these can be potentially distributed, but for this investigation
we assume that they can either be all preallocated at the start, or only dynamically al-
located during the epidemic. If antivirals are preallocated at the start, only a proportion
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of households will receive them, so they are allocated randomly to households according to
some distribution. In general this distribution is taken to be the household size distribution,
h, so that all sized households are equally likely to be allocated antivirals, but in Section
5.5 different allocation distributions are investigated.
A household which has been preallocated antivirals (a = 3) will start taking them
immediately (a = 1) upon the appearance of the first infectious individual in that household.





H(s,e,0,k,3) − 1, H(s,e−1,1,k,1) + 1
)
.
There is also the possibility that a household takes its preallocated antivirals incorrectly





H(s,e,0,k,3) − 1, H(s,e,0,k,1) + 1
)
,
which is assumed to happen at rate ψ.
When considering dynamic allocation the number of antivirals used by the population
at time t is required. This can be calculated directly from the state of the system by looking





Thus a household which has not been given antivirals (a = 0) is allocated them at a rate ζ
after the first infection event within the household if they are available (i.e., if A(t) < M).
Once a household is taking antivirals (a = 1) they last for a mean period of 1/κ before
they are consumed and the household enters state a = 2. A household is thus only ever
allocated, in either scheme, one course of antivirals, in line with current allocation policies.
All the transitions and rates of the stochastic households model are summarised in Table 1.










where Nk is the number of households of size k. It can be seen that the size of the state
space, |S|, will be too large to allow numerical solution of the forward equations when {Nk}
is anything other than trivial. The process may be simulated using the Gillespie algorithm
[22], but such simulations are computationally intensive for the population sizes of interest
for comparing antiviral schemes, in particular when desiring a reasonable level of accuracy
on estimates and conclusions. These computational considerations motivate the derivation




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As we are interested in the average behaviour of a pandemic in a large population, a de-
terministic approximation to the stochastic households model which is fast to compute is
desired [33, 43]. The first step in this derivation is to write the transitions of our process in
terms of stoichiometric matrices and corresponding rate vectors.
The (m,n)th entry of a stoichiometric matrix corresponds to a transition from a house-
hold in configuration n to m for each n = (s, e, i, k, a) ∈ C and m = (s∗, e∗, i∗, k∗, a∗) ∈ C.
The stoichiometric matrix, L1, corresponding to infection has (m,n)th entry,
L
(m,n)
1 = δa,a∗δk,k∗δi,i∗(−δs,s∗δe,e∗ + δs,s∗+1δe,e∗−1).
The matrix L1 can be used to represent infection both with antivirals, and without antivirals.
As such, set L2 = L1. The vectors which encapsulate the rates at which these two transitions





















representing infection into a household which contains individuals who are not currently
taking antivirals, and are taking antivirals, respectively.




3 = δa,a∗δk,k∗δs,s∗(−δe,e∗δi,i∗ + δe,e∗+1δi,i∗−1)(1− δa,3),




However, for preallocated households that have not commenced their course of antivirals,
the stoichiometric matrix corresponding to progression, L4, has (m,n)th component,
L
(m,n)
4 = δk,k∗δs,s∗δa,3δi,0(−δa∗,3δe,e∗δi∗,0 + δa∗,1δe,e∗+1δi∗,1),
while the corresponding rate vector, y4, is identical to y3.




5 = δa,a∗δk,k∗δe,e∗δs,s∗(−δi,i∗ + δi,i∗+1),




For the introduction of antivirals into a household after the first infection event, the
stoichiometric matrix, L6, has (m,n)th component,
L
(m,n)
6 = δk,k∗δi,i∗δe,e∗δs,s∗δa,0(−δa∗,0 + δa∗,1)(1− δi,0),
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7 = δk,k∗δi,i∗δe,e∗δs,s∗δa,1(−δa∗,1 + δa∗,2),




Finally, the stoichiometric matrix for the incorrect taking of antivirals in households
preallocated antivirals has (m,n)th element,
L
(m,n)
8 = δk,k∗δi,0δi∗,0δe,e∗δs,s∗δa,3(−δa∗,3 + δa∗,1),















of the process H(t) are density dependent in the sense of Kurtz
[33], so they can be written as
y
(n)









depend only on the state of the process through the









































It is then possible to apply Theorem 3.1 of Kurtz [33] to establish convergence, uniformly








as the number of households N →∞; provided the initial density is close to the initial pro-
portion in the deterministic trajectory. This system of differential equations can be solved
using Runge-Kutta techniques, such as those implemented in MATLAB’s ode45, as used
herein.
For the dynamic allocation scheme the allocation of antivirals depends on there being
sufficient antivirals in the stockpile remaining at time t. Equation (3) can be rewritten in










j Ljwj(x(t)) if A(t) < M,∑




6 = 0 for all n = (s, e, i, k, a) ∈ C when no more antivirals can be introduced into the
population.
3.1 Initial condition
In order to numerically solve the deterministic approximation, a suitable initial condition is
required. The initial condition must be such that the proportion of the population in each
state is sufficiently large [33]. Further, the initial transient behaviour should be eliminated
so that the system starts in the early exponential growth phase of the pandemic. This allows
for a fairer comparison of the general behaviour of the pandemic under a dynamic allocation
and a preallocation scheme.
The suitable initial condition has the form,




where xs is the (unstable equilibrium) state in which all individuals are susceptible to the
disease, v1 is the eigenvector corresponding to the dominant eigenvalue of the system and
i0 is the initial proportion of infectious individuals in the population. Full details of this
initial condition are contained in Appendix A. Note, the dominant eigenvalue is also the
early growth rate (Malthusian parameter) of the process.
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4 Quantities of interest
In order to compare antiviral allocation schemes, four key quantities are utilised. The first
of these is the expected epidemic final size; this is the total number of individuals who
were infected over the course of the pandemic [10]. As there is no waning immunity in
this model, the total number of infected individuals is equivalent to the total number of
recovered individuals once the pandemic is complete. A lower expected epidemic final size
means that the pandemic outbreak was less severe. Also calculated are the expected peak
size and expected peak time of the pandemic: let I(t) be the number of infectious individuals
in the population at time t, then the peak size is,
max{I(t)|t > 0},
and the peak time is,
arg max{I(t)|t > 0}.
Generally, a smaller peak size is desired as this means that there is less peak demand on
the health system, and a longer peak time is desired in order to give more time for control
measures and management plans to be implemented. The final quantity of interest is the
expected early growth rate [31]. This is given by the dominant eigenvalue of the system,
which is calculated when determining the initial condition in equation (7) (see A). A lower
early growth rate means that less individuals are being infected per unit time early in the
pandemic, and so the pandemic outbreak is not as severe during this time.
4.1 Parameters
Two pandemic scenarios are investigated: a mild outbreak which is similar to the 2009 H1N1
Swine influenza pandemic, and also a severe outbreak which is similar to the 1918 Span-
ish pandemic [39]. The parameters are matched to estimates of the latent and infectious
periods, and to previous estimates of R∗, where calculation of the latter for our stochastic
households model is effected using the method of [43, 8].
Unlike more traditional pandemic analyses, The basic reproductive umber, R0, is not
used as a measure of pandemic severity. The basic reproductive number, R0, is defined
to be the expected number of secondary infections caused by one infected individual in an
otherwise fully susceptible population [1, 41]. In a population with household structure, the
basic reproductive number cannot reliably be used to predict the severity of an outbreak
[5, 43]. For example, if the rate of infection between households α = 0, then a high R0 value
would not result in a pandemic outbreak; R0 no longer acts as a threshold parameter deter-
mining whether invasion is possible in structured models. Instead, we choose to utilise the
household reproductive number, R∗, as a measure of pandemic severity [5]. The household
reproductive number, R∗, is the number of infections introduced into susceptible house-
holds by a single household, in an otherwise fully susceptible (and infinite) population. It is
known that R∗ acts as a threshold parameter in a model with this population structure [3, 5].
The 2009 H1N1 Swine influenza pandemic had an estimated R∗ of approximately 1.3 [21],
while the Spanish influenza pandemic had an estimated R∗ of approximately 1.8 [39]. The
rate of recovery is fixed at γ = 1 for both sets of parameters, scaling time to units of average
infectious period. The purpose of this scaling is to reduce the number of free parameters
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in the model, and to avoid issues with varying estimates between the different strains of
influenza [21, 12]. For both sets of parameters, we let σ = 1, so the latent (exposed) period
is on average the same duration as the infectious period, as approximately true for influenza,
but also assess sensitivity to this parameter. The estimates on the effectiveness of antivirals
is varied, with some estimates claiming a 60% reduction in susceptibility [20, 36]. However,
these figures have been disputed [29]. In this work, a more conservative estimate of antiviral
effectiveness is chosen, setting the reduction in susceptibility, ρ, and infectiousness, τ , to 0.3
in line with some experimental estimates [44, 26]; we also set the mean effective duration
of antivirals, κ = 1, so they last one infectious period on average. However, sensitivity to
these parameters is also assessed.
The mean delay until antivirals arrive into a household, ζ, has not been explored previ-
ously in detail. One estimate for this delay in the United Kingdom during the 2009 Swine
influenza pandemic was approximately one infectious period, implying ζ = 1 [21]. This is
clearly long — half of the index individuals would be recovered before they receive antivi-
rals. Considered here is a smaller mean delay, relative to this United Kingdom estimate,
effectively representing what would happen if significant effort were made to reduce the
delay compared to the 2009 Swine influenza pandemic; we set the rate at which antivirals
arrive into a household, ζ = 2, which is a mean antiviral delivery time of approximately
half an infectious period. Also investigated is the effect of this delay, ranging from ζ = 2,
through to ζ = 0.66, in order to assess the importance of rapid antiviral delivery. This is in
addition to a comprehensive sensitivity analysis on all parameters (see Section 5.3).
The household size distribution, h, is taken to resemble that of Australia according to
the 2011 national census [2]. That is,
h = [0.2434, 0.3397, 0.1598, 0.1569, 0.0675, 0.0231, 0.0058, 0.0039],
giving a mean household size of approximately k̄ = 2.577. Note that the household size
distributions of the UK and USA are very close to that of Australia. The mild parameter
set is defined to have β = 0.9669 and α = 0.8; this gives ([43, 8]) a household reproductive
ratio, R∗, of 1.3. Similarly, the severe parameter set is defined to have β = 1.1259 and
α = 1; this gives a household reproductive ratio, R∗, of 1.8. All parameters are presented
in Table 2. Finally, the population size is fixed at 105 individuals, and so the number of








First, a numerical verification of the deterministic approximation is provided. Then, ex-
ploration into the key quantities associated with a pandemic for both a mild and severe
outbreak under both a dynamic and preallocation scheme is performed. Next, a full sensi-
tivity analysis is undertaken for the eight parameters that govern the dynamics, and finally












h Australian Census, 2011
Table 2: Definition of the mild and severe parameter sets.
5.1 Numerical verification
In Section 3, it was shown that the scaled Markov chain, N−1H(t), converges uniformly in
probability over finite time intervals to the deterministic approximation, x(t), as the number
of households, N →∞. This result is illustrated numerically in Figure 1. The figure shows
the difference between the mean of one hundred simulated realisations of the stochastic
process, scaled by the population size, and the deterministic approximation. The negative
values indicate the stochastic process being less than the deterministic approximation, while
the positive values indicate the stochastic process being larger than the deterministic approx-
imation. For just 103 households, the error is in the order of 10−2, while for 105 households,
the error is of order 10−4. The point where the error is closest to 0 aligns very closely to
the peak of the pandemic, suggesting that the peak size and peak time of the epidemic is
well estimated by the deterministic approximation. Overall, this verification suggests that
the deterministic approximation is relatively accurate for a realistic population size, and so
will be used for the remainder of the results.
5.2 Comparison of antiviral allocation schemes
The Australian Health Management Plan for Pandemic Influenza [16] currently specifies
that antivirals would be utilised according to a dynamic allocation scheme in the event
of an influenza outbreak. Investigated here the differences between the dynamic allocation
scheme and the preallocation scheme in terms of expected epidemic final size, expected peak
size, expected peak time and expected early growth rate.
Figure 2 shows the expected epidemic final size as a function of the number of antivi-
rals available in the population. It can be seen that for a severe pandemic outbreak, the
preallocation scheme leads to a smaller expected epidemic final size than the dynamic al-
location scheme, regardless of the amount of available antivirals, although the differences
are generally small. However, for a mild outbreak the dynamic allocation scheme leads to a
smaller expected epidemic final size than the preallocation scheme for antiviral availabilities
up to approximately 70% of the population. The reason that dynamic allocation performs
better in a mild outbreak, compared to a severe outbreak, is that there is less infection per
unit time, and so the delay until antivirals arrive into a household has less of an impact
compared to in a severe outbreak.
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Figure 1: Difference between the average of 100 simulated realisations and the deterministic
approximation using the severe parameter set, varying the number of households.
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Figure 2: Comparison of the expected epidemic final size under both a dynamic alloca-
tion scheme (blue) and a preallocation scheme (red). The solid lines are using the severe
parameter set, and the dashed lines are using the mild parameter set.
Figure 3 compares the (a) expected early growth rate, (b) expected peak time and (c)
expected peak size, under both a dynamic and a preallocation scheme. It can seen that
the dynamic allocation scheme leads to superior values for all these quantities for antivi-
ral availabilities up to approximately 70% of the population, regardless of the pandemic
severity parameter set. In contrast to the final size of an epidemic, the growth rate, ex-
pected peak size and expected peak time are all quantities associated with the earlier stages
of the pandemic. Dynamic allocation ensures that all members of a household that have
experienced infection receive antivirals (with some delay), at least early in the pandemic.
However, preallocation utilises the supply of antivirals more uniformly throughout the pan-
demic. Therefore it is not unexpected that dynamic allocation yields superior results for
these early time quantities compared to preallocation. However, for a severe outbreak, pre-
allocation yields a smaller expected epidemic final size compared to dynamic allocation.
It can also be seen in both Figures 2 and 3 that for a dynamic allocation scheme, there
exists a maximum effective amount of antivirals, indicated by the flattening of curves past
a particular threshold of proportion of antivirals available. Having more antivirals available
than this threshold gives no benefit in terms of the key quantities of a pandemic. This
effective amount exists as the pandemic ends before any more antivirals can be given out. It
is this maximum effective amount of antivirals that leads to the preallocation scheme having
a smaller expected epidemic final size when there is a large amount of antivirals available
for the population.
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Figure 3: Comparisons of the (a) expected early growth rate, (b) expected peak time, and (c)
expected peak size for an epidemic under a dynamic allocation scheme and a preallocation
scheme. The solid lines are using the severe parameter set, and the dashed lines are using
the mild parameter set.
15
Figure 4: Required proportion of households who use antivirals incorrectly for a dynamic
scheme to be preferable to a preallocation scheme in terms of epidemic final size, for a severe
outbreak (solid line) and a mild outbreak (dashed line).
5.2.1 Incorrect taking of antivirals
One important consideration in the practical implementation of the preallocation scheme is
the potential for incorrect taking of antivirals. Unfortunately, there is no data for inferring
the value of the parameter ψ, which controls this aspect of the model, as the preallocation
scheme is not currently used for antiviral distribution. For this reason, the proportion of
households required to use antivirals incorrectly in order for a dynamic allocation scheme to
lead to a smaller expected epidemic final size than a preallocation scheme is calculated, and
presented in Figure 4. It can be seen that for a severe pandemic outbreak, if between 30%
and 70% of households have antivirals available, then between 10% and 15% of households
can use their supply of antivirals incorrectly before a dynamic allocation scheme gives the
same expected epidemic final size as the preallocation scheme. For a mild outbreak, there
is more evidence that a dynamic allocation scheme would be preferable. In particular, until
approximately 80% of households have antivirals available, no more than 10% of households
can use antivirals incorrectly in order for a preallocation scheme to give a lower expected epi-
demic final size. However, when a large amount of the population have antivirals available,
the required proportion of households who can use antivirals incorrectly increases rapidly.
5.3 Sensitivity analysis
As the deterministic approximation is fast to compute, a a full sensitivity analysis of our
model can be performed. The sensitivity to the within-household infection rate, β, between-
household infection rate, α, recovery rate, γ, progression rate, σ, the reduction in suscep-
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tibility, τ , and infectivity, ρ, the rate governing the duration of antivirals, κ, and, for the
dynamic allocation scheme, the rate at which antivirals arrive in a household, ζ is assessed.
All parameters are varied by 10%, with the exception of β, which is varied by −5% in the
severe parameter case, and +4% in the mild parameter case, in order to avoid overlapping
parameters. The proportion of antivirals available is fixed at 35%, in line with probable
stockpile sizes [38, 11]. The full sensitivity analysis results in 6560 different combinations of
parameters. The results of a one parameter sensitivity analysis are contained in Tables 3,
4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix.
While some of the parameters cause large increases or decreases in key quantities—in
particular the rate of recovery, γ, and also the between-household infection rate, α—the
conclusions that are drawn comparing the two allocation schemes are relatively robust. For
the mild parameter case, preallocation led to a smaller expected epidemic final size in 35%
of cases, a longer expected peak time in 14% of cases, but never yielded a smaller expected
peak size or a smaller expected early growth rate when compared to the dynamic allocation
scheme. For the severe parameter case, preallocation gave a smaller expected epidemic fi-
nal size in 99% of cases, a smaller expected peak size in 0.3% of cases, but never a longer
expected peak time or smaller expected early growth rate when compared to the dynamic
allocation scheme.
There are a number of interesting features that are observed in the sensitivity analy-
sis, at least in the single parameter case. The effectiveness of antivirals appears to have
relatively little impact on the four assessed quantities, regardless of the antiviral allocation
scheme or severity of the outbreak. It is important to note here that a 10% variation in
the quantities is not large, but it demonstrates that the effectiveness of antivirals need not
be overly precise in this model. It also appears as though the effective antiviral duration,
controlled by κ, has minimal impact on the four key quantities.
Also of interest is the 35% of times in which preallocation gives a smaller expected epi-
demic final size in a mild outbreak, when compared to dynamic allocation. In general, this
happens when both β and α are increased. The 4% increase on β and the 10% increase on α
bring the infection parameters very close to the severe parameter set, so it is not surprising
that a preallocation scheme gives a better expected epidemic final size.
Finally, the progression rate, σ, has no impact on expected epidemic final size, as ex-
pected, but also has only a small impact on the expected peak size, expected peak time and
expected growth rate, regardless of the severity of the outbreak.
5.4 Impact of delay of antiviral delivery
Thus far the rate at which antivirals arrive to a household has been assumed to be fixed
at ζ = 2, which corresponds to a mean delay of half an infectious period. One estimate
of this delay from the 2009 Swine influenza epidemic is 1 infectious period, that is, ζ = 1
[21]. Hence, we were reasonably optimistic with regards to this aspect of the model. Due
to the speed of the deterministic approximation and the importance of this parameter, it
is important explore the impact of the delay on the expected epidemic final size, shown
in Figure 5. When two thirds of the population has access to antivirals, it can seen that
an average delay higher than 0.6 infectious periods (corresponding to ζ < 1.66) leads to
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Figure 5: Comparison of expected epidemic final size for various average delays until an-
tivirals arrive in a household. The number of antivirals is fixed at one third (solid lines) or
two thirds (dashed lines) of the population. All other parameters are taken from the mild
parameter set.
preallocation giving a smaller expected epidemic final size than a dynamic allocation scheme.
When one third of the population have access to antivirals, it can seen that an average delay
higher than 0.95 infectious periods (corresponding to ζ < 1.05) leads to preallocation giving
a smaller expected epidemic final size also. This demonstrates that significant effort should
be made to ensure that the delay until antivirals arrive into a household is low, or else
preallocation is better than dynamic allocation.
5.5 Preallocation schemes
Thus far, all antivirals under a preallocation scheme have been allocated according to
the household size distribution, h. Implementing such a distribution scheme is relatively
straightforward – a household is chosen uniformly at random from the population, and all
members of that household are preallocated antivirals. There are other potential methods of
preallocation. One alternative preallocation scheme is to utilise the size-biased distribution,
π. When considering a population with heterogeneous household sizes, the jth component





is the probability of contact of an infectious individual with a susceptible individual who
belongs to a household of size j [5, 8]. Other potential preallocation schemes include allo-
cating to the smallest households first, or to the largest households first.
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In Figure 6, comparisons of these different preallocation schemes in terms of the ex-
pected epidemic final size are shown, as a function of the maximum proportion of the popu-
lation who have antivirals available. For the severe parameter set, allocating to the largest
household first, smallest household first, or according to the household size distribution or
size-biased distribution, produce very similar impacts on epidemic final size. All prealloca-
tion schemes are better than dynamic allocation in this case. For the mild parameter set,
the differences between the various preallocation schemes are more pronounced. Allocating
according to the largest household size first yields the smallest expected epidemic final size,
amongst the preallocation schemes. From the results, allocating to the largest household
size first appears to be a robust preallocation choice.
6 Discussion
In this paper, an alternative scheme for allocating antivirals during an influenza pandemic,
which we have called preallocation, has been investigated. A deterministic approxima-
tion, to a new stochastic households model, which is fast to compute has been derived.
The deterministic approximation allows exploration of pandemic scenarios efficiently, unlike
Monte-Carlo simulation methods [18, 15, 37]. However, the deterministic approximation is
unable to assess the effects of stochasticity, unlike some other methods [43, 8].
The effectiveness of antivirals during a pandemic has been questioned previously as a
consequence of the delays in distributing antivirals to households under the dynamic allo-
cation scheme [8]. This work is one of the first studies which assesses a different antiviral
allocation scheme, preallocation, which seeks to remove this delay. A comparison has been
performed using the epidemic final size, peak size, peak time and the early growth rate. It
has been shown that the theoretical best choice between these allocation scheme depends
on the severity of the pandemic outbreak, the antiviral stockpile size, the delay in antiviral
delivery under the dynamic allocation scheme, and also on the quantity used to perform the
assessment.
For a severe pandemic outbreak, the preallocation scheme generally gave a smaller epi-
demic final size, but a larger peak size and early growth rate. If only one of these quantities
were considered, then the benefits of the allocation schemes may not be seen. Intuitively, the
dynamic allocation scheme ensures that all individuals early in the pandemic receive antivi-
rals. However, preallocation has antivirals actively being used more uniformly throughout a
pandemic, and so the benefits of preallocation may not be seen when looking at quantities
associated with the early stages of the pandemic. It is worth noting that, particularly for a
severe outbreak, a preallocation scheme can yield a smaller epidemic final size.
Also considered was households taking antivirals incorrectly under the preallocation
scheme. It was shown that, for a severe outbreak, if the proportion of the population which
has antivirals available is greater than 20%, then more than 10% of those who have been
preallocated antivirals would have to use antivirals incorrectly for a dynamic allocation
scheme to give a lower epidemic final size than a preallocation scheme. For a mild outbreak
though, a dynamic allocation scheme already gives a lower expected epidemic final size until
approximately 70% of the population has antivirals available. After this point, however, the
proportion of households that can use antivirals incorrectly increases steeply.
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Figure 6: Comparison of different preallocation methods compared to a dynamic allocation
scheme on the expected epidemic final size using the (a) severe parameter set and the (b)
mild parameter set.
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One important consideration for pandemic response is the amount of antivirals that are
available for distribution. In this work, all possibilities of stockpile size have been considered.
In reality, it is unlikely that a country would stockpile a very large amount of antivirals,
due to the cost of maintaining this stockpile. The realistic supply of antivirals is likely to
be less than 50% of the population [38, 11]. It is worth noting that in the unrealistically
high ranges of antivirals, the preallocation scheme consistently yields better results than the
dynamic allocation scheme. However, when between 25% and 50% of the population have
antivirals available, the dynamic scheme is superior with the exception of the epidemic final
size for a severe outbreak.
Also investigated was different methods of preallocation, based upon how antivirals are
distributed to households of different sizes. For a severe outbreak, the tested preallocation
methods differed in expected epidemic final size by less than 1%. From results for both
parameter sets, allocating to the largest household size first appears to be a robust preallo-
cation choice. Allocating to the largest household first is similar to the equalisation principle
in the optimal vaccination problem [6, 32]. The main difference in this case is that we are
allocating to entire households, not individuals, as is the case in the optimal vaccination
problem. Allocating to largest households first may still not be optimal, and a potential
extension of this work would be to determine the optimal preallocation method.
A benefit of the deterministic approximation we have derived is its computational effi-
ciency, hence allowing us to perform a full sensitivity analysis, consisting of 6560 combina-
tions of parameters. This full set of analyses was completed in approximately five and a
half hours on an Intel i5 processor. This type of sensitivity analysis is not practical using
Monte Carlo methods. The sensitivity analysis showed that, although key quantities associ-
ated with the pandemic can change significantly, the choice of optimal scheme is relatively
robust. That is, for a severe outbreak, a preallocation scheme yields a smaller expected
epidemic final size, while for a mild outbreak, a dynamic allocation scheme tends to yield a
smaller expected epidemic final size.
The model we have described can incorporate much more flexibility in the allocation
schemes than we have investigated in this paper. Hybrid schemes can be investigated by
preallocating some proportion of antivirals at the beginning and then dynamically distribut-
ing the rest. The number of antivirals available, M , could also be made a function of time,
representing production during the pandemic.
This work demonstrates the impact of the delay of antiviral distribution under a dy-
namic allocation scheme. If the delay can be made noticeably smaller than during the 2009
Swine influenza epidemic, then a dynamic allocation scheme often gives a smaller epidemic
impact and is more robust than a preallocation scheme. Given the practical considerations
of implementing a preallocation scheme in conjunction with our analysis, it motivates a
focus on attempting to reduce the delay in delivering antivirals under a dynamic allocation
scheme during a future pandemic.
The scenarios we have considered here do have some limitations. One limitation is that
we have assumed that there are negligible deaths throughout the pandemic. While death
is somewhat similar to recovery as a modelling assumption, the minimisation of death in
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a population has been a focus of other studies [23, 25]. We expect that minimisation of
epidemic final size would also contribute to a lower number of deaths; however, this concept
has not been verified here. Another limitation is that our models do not account explicitly
for asymptomatic infections, which are likely to be of significant number, in particular un-
der a mild scenario. However, we anticipate that this feature would impact both allocation
schemes in a similar manner, and hence not lead to significant changes when comparing be-
tween schemes. Finally, this work does not account for the possibility of vaccine development
during the outbreak. Current estimates of the time to produce and commence distribution
of such a vaccine is approximately 6 months, but could be potentially longer [19, 47, 46]. As
such, a vaccine is almost certain to become available post-peak in all scenarios considered
here, but potentially at a stage to have some impact upon our assessment with respect to the
epidemic final size, in particular under a mild scenario, depending upon vaccine efficacy and
supply levels. The effect would likely be to provide some advantage to dynamic allocation
in such a scenario, and hence further supports our overall conclusions.
New strains of influenza have caused pandemics approximately every 30 years. Events
of the past would indicate that control of future pandemics is of great importance. With
antiviral developments in progress [7], research is needed to fully understand the best use
of such antivirals. The extensions and ideas presented throughout this work will hopefully
lead to a more efficient use of antivirals, and hence to a smaller impact of future pandemics.
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A Derivation of the initial condition
Consider the population state xs, the state in which all individuals are susceptible to the
disease. It is ideal to start the system near the point xs. As such, an initial condition of
the form,
x(0) = xs + ω,
is sought. To determine ω, a linear stability analysis to the system [30] is applied. Let
F (x(t)) =
∑













= F (xs) + Jxs(x(t)− xs)
= Jxs(x(t)− xs),






As equation (8) is a system of constant coefficient linear differential equations, the system
can be decomposed in terms of its eigenvalues and eigenvectors. Let Jxs have eigenvalues
λ1, . . . , λn, where Re(λ1) > · · · > Re(λn), with corresponding eigenvectors v1, . . . ,vn. It
follows that, ∆(t) =
∑n
j=1 εje
tλjvj, where εj are coefficients that are yet to be determined.
Hence,





In the expansion, only the dominant eigenvalue, λ1, with corresponding eigenvector v1 is
considered. As such,
x(t) = xs + ε1e
tλ1v1. (9)
Consider now the system at time t = 0;
x(0) = xs + ε1v1. (10)




x(s,e,i,k,a)(0)i = x(0) · i,
where i is the vector of infectious individuals, i, in each state (s, e, i, k, a) ∈ C. Using
equation (10) yields,
x(0) · i = xs · i + ε1(i · v1),
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but, xs · i = 0, as there is no infectious individuals when the population is in state xs, and
so
x(0) · i = i0 = ε1(i · v1).





Substituting this expression into equation (10) gives the equation for the initial condition,




Consider the Jacobian of the system. As each stoichiometric matrix, Li, is constant,
the only terms that need to be differentiated are the rate vectors, wi(x(t)). The first rate
vector, w1, is non-linear in xn(t) as Î(t) is also a function of xn(t). To differentiate this
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B Sensitivity analysis tables
+/- Final Size Peak Size Peak Time Growth
β + 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.07
- -0.02 -0.05 0.02 -0.04
α + 0.09 0.30 -0.13 0.23
- -0.12 -0.31 0.21 -0.24
γ + -0.15 -0.39 0.19 -0.26
- 0.13 0.52 -0.13 0.27
σ + 0.0 0.05 -0.04 0.05
- 0.0 -0.05 0.04 -0.05
τ + 0.0 0.0 0.02 -0.03
- 0.0 0.0 -0.02 0.03
ρ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
κ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.02
- 0.0 0.0 -0.01 0.02
ζ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.01
Table 3: Sensitivity analysis for dynamic allocation scheme using the severe parameter set.
+/- Final Size Peak Size Peak Time Growth
β + 0.04 0.09 -0.04 0.07
- -0.11 -0.22 0.11 -0.18
α + 0.25 0.75 -0.23 0.52
- -0.48 -0.65 0.58 -0.55
γ + -0.54 -0.75 0.57 -0.66
- 0.34 1.25 -0.26 0.69
σ + 0.0 0.05 -0.03 0.04
- 0.0 -0.05 0.03 -0.05
τ + 0.0 -0.02 0.04 -0.06
- 0.0 0.02 -0.04 0.06
ρ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.01
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.01
κ + 0.0 -0.02 0.03 -0.04
- 0.0 0.02 -0.03 0.05
ζ + 0.0 0.0 -0.01 0.02
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.02
Table 4: Sensitivity analysis for dynamic allocation scheme using the mild parameter set.
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+/- Final Size Peak Size Peak Time Growth
β + 0.03 0.09 -0.04 0.05
- -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.03
α + 0.10 0.29 -0.11 0.19
- -0.12 -0.29 -0.16 -0.20
γ + -0.15 -0.38 0.13 -0.20
- 0.14 0.51 -0.10 0.21
σ + 0.0 0.05 -0.04 0.05
- 0.0 -0.05 0.05 -0.05
τ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ρ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
κ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 5: Sensitivity analysis for preallocation scheme using the severe parameter set.
+/- Final Size Peak Size Peak Time Growth
β + 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.04
- -0.09 -0.18 0.06 -0.11
α + 0.23 0.62 -0.16 0.33
- -0.30 -0.53 -0.23 -0.35
γ + -0.37 -0.64 0.20 -0.39
- 0.32 1.06 -0.16 0.41
σ + 0.0 0.05 -0.04 0.05
- 0.0 -0.05 0.04 -0.05
τ + 0.0 -0.01 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.01 0.0 0.0
ρ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
κ + 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Table 6: Sensitivity analysis for preallocation scheme using the mild parameter set.
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